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Abstract 
The purpose of the article: the reflection of legal hermeneutics as one of the main mechanisms for 
the interpretation of the principles and values of law. The research methodology is based on a 
complex combination of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, analogy, etc.), philosophical 
(hermeneutical) and special legal (regulatory and analytical, comparative legal) methods. The 
scientific novelty of the work in the disclosure of consists in revealing the significance of legal 
hermeneutics as one of the main mechanisms for interpreting the principles and values of law, as 
well as the study of the possibilities of applying legal hermeneutics in reformed legal systems. 
Conclusions. The need to apply hermeneutical practices in law arose due to the discrepancy between 
the concepts of «legal act» and «law». Statutory instrument is considered only as a guide on the road 
to living law. At the same time, while awarding judgement, the judge must understand what the 
legislator has invested in the content of the law and how to interpret it in a particular case. Thus, it is 
obvious that the legal hermeneutics expressively demonstrates the essence of law as a pure legal, 
natural one.  Legal hermeneutics acquires a new axiological level, which opens up a new way to the 
perception of a person, his rights and freedoms by the highest social values. The absence of a 
legislative monopoly on lawmaking makes it possible to take into account the significance of legal 
values and principles at all stages of the creation and application of law.  
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The peculiarity of law in the states of the Roman-German and Anglo-American legal 
families is that it consists not only of the legal norms created by the legislator, but also covers 
their interpretatiis the role of modern lawyers. The starting point of any legal thinking is the 
statutory instruments. However, in general, they are only the basis, the foundation of legal 
structures, the content of which must be expanded by interpretation. 
 
The introduction of modern digital technologies into legal practice strengthens the 
formalism of many legal actions (digital contract templates, standard verification and other 
computer procedures, and etc). However, the whole variety of newly emerging and already 
existing legal procedures cannot take into account a huge amount of human`s socio-
economic activities. This, in turn, requires the establishmentn of a hermeneutic link between 
legal schemes and practical actions of subject of law. 
 
The ability to correctly and adequately interpret legal texts is one of the 
manifestations of the high legal culture of a lawyer. In this regard, interpretation takes the 
leading place in modern legal science and practice, this creates the need to show with 




The interpretation of legal texts is subject of focus of many scholars. Thus, the 
Russian researcher Marina Bayteyeva  adresses to the problem of understanding legal texts 
from the standpoint of Gadamer's hermeneutics. In her opinion, the main problem of the 
interpretation of texts of law is to bridge the gap between the general (normative text) and 
the special (legal case). In this regard, she considers the idea of Gadamer to solve the 
problem with the help of the philosophy of Aristotle. Such an understanding of the text 
connects such components in interpretation as the history of the text, the traditions of its 
perception and the life experience of the interpreter. This operation, the scientist concludes, 
ensures the success of both the interpretation of the text and the application of “general” 
statements to “special” cases, and also shows the relationship between the independence 
of one’s own understanding of things by the interpreter and their semantic description in the 
text1. 
 
The Chinese scholar Ch.-S.Yang refers to the specifics of the interpretation of legal 
texts by judges based on Gadamer's philosophy. Legal hermeneutics, the scholar writes, 
postulates that judges actively intervene in the process of interpreting laws based on 
“prejudice” and “hermeneutic circle”, which is contrary to the traditional legal syllogism. 
According to legal hermeneutics, the process of interpreting laws is not a process of 
perceiving or discovering existing laws, but a process of creating new acts. Legal 
hermeneutics, says Yang, was mainly formulated in German jurisprudence in the 1970s, 
accepting and theorizing philosophical hermeneutics and, in particular, the philosophical and 
ontological hermeneutics created by Hans-Georg Gadamer. In this regard, the Chinese 
philosopher analyzes the philosophical and ontological hermeneutics created by Gadamer 
in order to understand the philosophical foundations of legal hermeneutics. According to his 




1 M. V. Baiteyeva “Application of the “general” to the “special” from the standpoint of hermeneutics”. 
News of higher educational institutions, Jurisprudence, num 3 (2013): 34-49. 
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follows. Gadamer does not advocate that hermeneutics is understood as the methodology 
of the humanities just as Wilhelm Dilthey. This is because hermeneutics does not accept 
epistemological characteristics, but rather ontological characteristics. Gadamer, according 
to the scientist, justifies this, based on the “prejudice” that any unfinished has already had. 
This prejudice adopts the “preliminary structure of understanding” established by Heidegger. 
In addition, prejudices are based on "authority" and "tradition." Meanwhile, Gadamer argues 
that the ontological-hermeneutical understanding is considered through the historically 
extended fusion of the horizon in relation to the theory of the hermeneutic circle. Gadamer 
quotes it as “wirkungsgeschichtliches Prinzip.” Nevertheless, Gadamer argues that 
wirkungsgeschichtliches Prinzip is not only limited to humanitarian areas, but even applied 
in areas of natural science, using languages as a medium. Taking this into account, the 
researcher from China continues, ontological hermeneutics is literally asserted as a 
universal ontology. The philosophical and ontological hermeneutics formulated by Gadamer 
later produced many sensations. However, such a feeling was not limited to humanitarian 
fields, such as literary critics, the interpretation of history or classical philosophy. Gadamer's 
hermeneutics had a great influence on laws, social sciences and even natural sciences. At 
the same time, Yang writes, there was also a criticism of Gadamer's hermeneutics. For 
example, Jurgen Habermas, speaking with Gadamer in the debate on hermeneutics, 
criticizes that philosophical and ontological hermeneutics may be distorted by ideology, but 
this is ignored2. 
The specificity of legal hermeneutics is focused on the research of Brazilian scientists 
É. R. Messias and V. M. Do Karmo. They write that at present, legal hermeneutics has 
specific characteristics, since, due to vague legal concepts, a judge must play a very 
constructive role in the semantic content of the statements being analyzed, which 
contributes to the emergence of judicial activity3. 
The influence of the teachings of Paul Ricoeur on legal hermeneutics is analyzed by 
the Czech philosopher M. Piyenyazek, noting that Ricoeur developed a comprehensive 
theory of interpreting two seemingly distant phenomena: literary texts and human actions. 
By linking these questions, it becomes possible, based on the work of Ricoeur, to build a 
unified theory of the interpretation of legal texts and legally significant human actions. In this 
theory,continues Piyenyazek, for jurisprudence there is an opportunity to formulate a 
comprehensive theory of the application of law, which has proved itself well in the ontology 
of the recipient of a legal text. It should be emphasized, the Czech scholar believes that the 
benefits obtained as a result become especially noticeable when they viewed against the 
background of the methodological flaws of legal positivism regarding the interpretation of 
law4. 
The work of the Brazilian philosopher A. Y. Krell is devoted to the contribution of M. 
Heidegger to the subject under study. According to his views, Martin Heidegger, one of the 
most influential philosophers of the 20th century, is the theoretical reference point for an 
increasing   number  of  authors  in  the  legal  doctrine  of  Brazil,  especially  in the field of  
2 Yang Chun Soo, “A Study on the Philosophical Bases of Legal Hermeneutics - Focused on 
Gadamer’s philosophical-ontological hermeneutics”. Kangwon Law Review, num 49 (2016): 825-867. 
3 V. M. Do Carmo y E. R. Messias, “Post-modernity and legal principiology: The judicial activism and 
its validity in the context of the Democratic State of Law”, Revista brasileira de direito, num 3 (2017): 
189-205. 
4 M. Pieniazek, “The Application of Paul Ricoeur's Theory in Interpretation of Legal Texts and Legally 
Relevant Human Action”, International journal for the semiotics of law-revue internationale de 
semiotique juridique, num 3 (2015): 627-646. 
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hermeneutics, interpretation and application of the law. This contribution, according to Krell, 
hardly concerns objections that were directed against the ideas and theories of Heidegger. 
His use of the language, which is filled with mystical and poetic elements, has already been 
sharply criticized by several authors, who question their consistency and utility for 
confronting theoretical and practical problems. In fact, according to a Brazilian researcher, 
Heidegger’s ideas on hermeneutics in the field of law lead to a reassessment of 
understanding at the expense of explanations and reasoning. His idiomatic creations go 
beyond rationality, reflecting a rather subjective experience. At the same time, Krell 
concludes, his “hermeneutics of factuality” can hardly be used in the legal sphere, where 
rational communication should prevail to provide a better understanding of the key elements 
of the interpretation of the law, allowing even its criticism and control5. 
 
At the same time, recognizing the importance of hermeneutics for law, the authors 
are not always ready to recognize it as one of the main mechanisms of interpretation in legal 
science and practice. 
 
The purpose of the article is the reflection of legal hermeneutics as one of the basic 
mechanisms for interpreting the principles and values of law, which allows not only the 
legislator, but also judges to create law, as well as the study of the possibilities of using legal 
hermeneutics in reformed systems of law. 
 
Presentation of the main material 
 
It is known that the methodological basis of legal hermeneutics is philosophical 
hermeneutics6. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the original concept. Initially, 
hermeneutics (from the Greek germeneo - explain, interpret) understood the art of 
interpreting texts (ancient, legal, the Bible, and others) in order to search for their meaning; 
teaching about the principles of interpretation. In the late XIX - early XX century 
hermeneutics received the status of the doctrine of "understanding" and was often used as 
a methodological basis for the humanities (as opposed to "explanation" in the natural 
sciences)7. 
 
The founder of modern philosophical hermeneutics is the German philosopher, a 
student of Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer. Gadamera hermeneutics is a 
philosophy of understanding, which is the basic concept of hermeneutics. It is the category 
of “understanding” that is a universal characteristic of the totality of human knowledge about 
the world and the existence of man in it, as the philosopher writes in detail in the article 
“Language and Understanding”8. 
 
In traditional hermeneutics, “understanding” is realized through interpretation and is 
a sign that a person understands a certain thing, knows how to see and highlight what is 
essential in it. Thus, understanding is a unique way of knowing, the ability to think, the ability 
to  reason.  A  necessary  prerequisite  for  understanding  is  the gained  knowledge. They  
 
 
5 A. J. Krell, “The ontological hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger, His use of language and ITS 
importance for thelegal area”, Revista brasileira de estudos politicos, num 113 (2016): 101-147. 
6 A. E. Pisarevsky, Legal hermeneutics. Socio-philosophical methodology of interpretation and 
interpretation of legal norms. Extended abstract of PhD’s thesis (Krasnodar: Krasnodar Academy of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2004). 
7 P. Ricoeur, Conflict of interpretations. Essays on hermeneutics (Moscow: Medium, 1995). 
8 G. G. Gadamer, The relevance of the beautiful (Moscow: Art. 1991). 
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precede any understanding and constitute its initial basis. Thinking without such a basis 
would be fiction. The Russian researcher E. A. Nikitina adderes to a similar point of view. In 
her opinion, “understanding is achieved on the path of movement from the external language 
form of thinking to the internal essence of thinking, in which the psychological and 
grammatical methods help the researcher. Understanding the text meant getting used to the 
world of its author and reconstructing the past” 9. 
 
The starting point of philosophical hermeneutics is the hermeneutic circle, that is, a 
feature of the process of understanding, combined with its cyclical nature. Various 
modifications of the hermeneutic circle are connected with the understanding of the 
interdependence of explanation and interpretation, on the one hand, and understanding, on 
the other; in order to understand something, this phenomenon needs to be clarified, and 
vice versa. 
 
In traditional hermeneutics, the hermeneutic circle is considered as the interaction of 
a whole and a part: to understand a whole, it is necessary to understand its individual parts, 
but to understand parts it is necessary to have an idea of the content (meaning) of the whole. 
 
Thus, the goal of hermeneutics is not to break the hermeneutic circle, but to enter it 
and understand its specificity. The problem of the hermeneutic circle was central to the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger, who interpreted it in his own way. In contrast to the 
positivist-oriented philosophers who defended the position that knowledge is unconditioned 
by understanding, Heidegger regards understanding as the initial, necessary and essential 
basis of any process of knowledge. The basis of understanding, in his opinion, is the 
backbone of all human knowledge. It precedes knowledge, forms an ontological basis (way 
of being), on the basis of which a secondary understanding and scientific knowledge in 
general are built. If a researcher seeks to understand the essence of a phenomenon, act, 
deed, it is necessary, first of all, to understand the state of society as a whole (politics, 
economics, morality, law, etc.) in relation to which one can know the meaning of a certain 
phenomenon. This is the hermeneutic circle: the conditions of understanding in it are the 
comprehension of the state of society in general, and the understanding itself is the 
awareness of a certain phenomenon.  
 
Modern philosophical hermeneutics (E. Betty, J. Habermas, P. Ricoeur, G. 
Gadamer) is also based on Heidegger`s ideas. G. Gadámer, in particular, shares 
Heidegger’s views on the problem of the basis of understanding. He also believes that 
“understanding always incorporates the basis of understanding”10. At the same time, he 
makes adjustments to the Heideggerian doctrine regarding the basis of understanding, 
based on the fact that it is conditioned by the tradition on which each researcher relies. If M. 
Heidegger wanted to rethink the traditional philosophy, then Gadamer, on the contrary, calls 
to pay attention to the tradition, including the philosophical, as such, which causes not only 
the basis of understanding a person, but also the way of his being. The Gadamera 
hermeneutic circle means such an understanding, which is the interaction of the “movement 
of tradition and the interpreter”. As Gadamer stresses, “the work of a germeneut is not to 
develop an understanding procedure, but to clarify its conditions”11. 
 
 
9 E. A. Nikitina, “The problem of understanding in philosophical hermeneutics”. Prospects for science 
and education, num 5 (2015): 9-14 y V. M. Leibin, Freud, psychoanalysis and modern Western 
philosophy (Moscow: Political literature, 1990). 
10 P. Ricoeur, Conflict of interpretations… 
11 V. M. Leibin, Freud, psychoanalysis and modern Western philosophy… 
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Thus, Gadamer advocates recognition of the crucial role of tradition in the historical 
process and in human cognitive activity. Awareness and conquest of tradition, in his opinion, 
a necessary condition for any understanding. 
 
Modern Western jurisprudence makes extensive use of the philosophical doctrine of 
understanding and the hermeneutic circle. For example, based on the fact that philosophical 
hermeneutics is a general doctrine of understanding (interpretation), hermeneutic natural 
law is defined as rules of behavior that are formed on the basis of the anthropologically 
understandable nature of human. The means of anthropological understanding are 
phenomenology, existentialism, personalism, psychoanalysis, structuralism, utilitarianism, 
and religious phenomenology. Modern legal hermeneutics is the application in the law of 
existential-phenomenological hermeneutics, first of all, M. Heidegger, G. Gadamer and P. 
Ricoera. 
 
From the point of view of supporters of legal hermeneutics, law is not identical with 
the legal act. Traditionally, it is interpreted as justice, which is the result of freedom and civil-
political equality. The very same “freedom arises and affirms in the world in a somewhat 
invisible, but clearly designated form of law: in the form of law and order, responsibility, 
permits and prohibitions, offenses”12. The legislator is not the supreme interpreter of justice. 
Such interpreters in the state are judges, whose main task is the interpretation of legislation 
with a view to a fair resolution of a legal conflict. Here it is necessary to emphasize the 
independence of the judiciary from the legislative branch. 
 
A modern Western judge, a follower of hermeneutics, is guided by the richness of 
the content of daily life events, which give rise to the present “living” (and not “written”) law. 
It cannot be outlined by abstract legal norms; therefore, the judge should “find”, “extract” this 
law from the social content of the case under consideration, guided by reason, conscience, 
and ideas about the fair in modern life. This is the hermeneutic legal circle, which should be 
a lawyer. Regulations (codes, laws) are considered primarily as a kind of guidebooks in 
search of a fair solution, and not as strict rules, orders, to interpret and decide in a certain 
way. Western hermeneutics lawyers see in codes, laws, not a system of norms, but, rather, 
more or less clear boundaries of legal constructions that need to be filled with interpretation. 
What the legislator has not prescribed, the court may add. Codes, therefore, are only starting 
points, and not the completion of legal regulation of relations. 
 
This state of affairs means that the law in the states of the Anglo-American legal 
family consists not only of the legal norms formulated by the legislator, it also covers their 
interpretation by the judges. Decisions made by the judge due to the interpretation of legal 
norms are the source of law, that is, the judge acts as the creator of the legal norm. 
 
It should be noted that the Anglo-American legal hermeneutics is fundamentally 
different from the approach of lawyers of the Romano-Germanic legal family to the 
interpretation of legal texts. The latter are trying to understand what the legislator wanted to 
say, and representatives of the Anglo-American hermeneutics determine the objective 
content of the text, regardless of the position of the legislator. This is possible using the 
methodology of the hermeneutic circle. A lawyer should apply this methodology with the 
deep conviction that only on the basis of hermeneutic interpretation can be made a fair 
decision  in  any  given  situation.  At  the same time, he should operate well with factors of  
 
12 O. G. Danilyan; A. P. Dzeban; Y. Y. Kalinovsky; E. A. Kalnytskyi y S. B. Zhdanenko, “Personal 
information rights and freedoms within the modern society”, Informatologia, num 51 (2018): 24-33. 
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understanding, among which are the circular nature of thinking, the background of 
experience and the relativity of judgment about the content of the subject, highlighted by V. 
Dilthey and analyzed taking into account modern views by Russian scientist A. E. 
Bochkarev13. 
 
Recall that the starting point of the hermeneutic circle is a condition for 
understanding; it is the basis of all human knowledge. In jurisprudence, the method of 
understanding the legal act is a preliminary understanding of the nature of personality. In 
European universities, such a preliminary understanding of the legal act is called “pre-law”. 
The pre-law precedes purely legal knowledge and forms the ontological basis (way of being) 
on the basis of which a secondary understanding is built. 
 
A secondary understanding is a definite decision of a judge, and a fair decision of a 
judge is impossible without his understanding of the conditions for understanding the 
essence of the legal act. 
 
Thus, according to the terms of the hermeneutic circle, on the one hand, the judge 
must be well aware of the condition of understanding the legal act  (the nature of the person 
and the economic, political, ethical side of the case associated with it), and on the other, 
make a decision (secondary understanding of law) based on the conditions of understanding 
the legal act. The decision of the judge is the final point at which the law is disclosed in its 
specific completeness. 
 
Obviously, legal hermeneutics expressively demonstrates the essence of law as 
being above legal. In order to know such an entity, it is necessary to leave the boundaries 
of the jurisprudence itself and begin to learn from the anthropological foundations. It is not 
by chance that the idea that “natural law exists not for limited people, but for those who are 
able to think” is common in Europe14. 
 
Thus, the hermeneutic concept of the differences between law and legal act is 
inherent in the original way of finding the law. The “real” law, according to the interpretation 
of the hermeneutics supporters, unites in itself the complementary elements of the essence 
(justice as a natural state of a person) and existence (exhibition). Hermeneutics explores 
law in the development, concretization, unification of essence and existence (act, event) in 
the hermeneutic circle. This process is not limited to the level of legislation and, mainly, is 
carried out at the level of legal proceedings. According to the deep conviction of supporters 
of legal hermeneutics (A. Kaufman, X. Lommpart, O. Heffe, L. Fuller), a legal solution cannot 
be obtained in the final form only by deduction from the norm, jurisdiction is not just 
“application of the legal act”. The legal act is only a sample of the decision that is proposed 
to the judge, it is not a sufficient source of a specific decision. The legal norms and specific 
situation given to the judge are only “raw materials” for the birth of a “real” law. 
 
The well-known German hermeneous law A. Kaufman believes that the hermeneutic 
method gives an understanding of “real” law, since the basis of its hermeneutic finding is 
something “ontological” (freedom as the natural state of a person) that cannot be removed 
directly  from  the  abstract  legal  norm  and  that  the  judge does not can "dispose of at its  
 
 
13 A. E. Bochkarev, “On understanding factors as a condition of interpretation”, Questions of cognitive 
linguistics, num 1 (2009): 103-106. 
14 M. Gibney y S. Deitsev, “Approach to the teaching of law at US universities”, State and law, num 3 
(1993): 125 - 132. 
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discretion," is a "thing-law." What the judge cannot “dispose by his own discretion” (here A. 
Kaufman adheres to the views of X. Gadamer), the ontological “thing-law” is not something 
“material and substantial”, but the law is that which belongs to him in this relationship as a 
“person”. “Person” is what explains the essence and content of legal discourse (finding the 
law through communication)15. 
 
It is easy to see that the legal hermeneutics of A. Kaufman is also based on the 
hermeneutic circle: the “person” (legal personality) and a definite court decision in a 
particular case are its constituent parts. 
 
Legal hermeneutics, Kaufman notes, opposes the “false belief” that all legal 
phenomena can be reflected in general terms, and then the legal reality can be seen as a 
manifestation or application of the content of these concepts in individual cases. In fact, the 
regulation can not determine the decision of the judge, and the judge is able to become 
"wiser than the legislator." Supporters of hermeneutics in law also stressed that today the 
legislator offers the judge “poor-quality samples of decisions”, so only justice can now 
implement justice in real life16. 
 
As noted above, in Western countries the law consists not only of legal norms, but 
also incorporates their interpretation by judges. From the point of view of followers of legal 
hermeneutics, interpretation is more than a scientific activity, it is a manifestation of wisdom. 
The goal of hermeneutic lawyers is to reduce the law to wisdom, and not to science17. 
 
Numerous facts of the interpretation of natural law as supra-legal principles of justice 
can be found in the legal theory and practice of Germany, the United States and a number 
of other countries. For example, in the Federal Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the principle is the formula: “when the injustice of the legal act becomes 
intolerable, it must retreat before justice”. In particular, the decision of this court of December 
14, 1968 states: “legal regulations cannot be recognized as valid law if they are so contrary 
to the fundamental principles of justice that a judge who wanted to apply them, instead of a 
law, would formulate the wrong”18. 
 
It represents an interest and recommendations to the judges formulated by the 
Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany: “A judge cannot ignore a 
possible conflict of norms with the ideas of material justice in an altered society, referring to 
the fact that the literal text of the law has remained unchanged; the judge needs to more 
freely apply the rule of law if he does not want to deviate from his task of speaking ”19. 
 
The requirement of a “correct” interpretation of the legal act is also reflected in the 
official statement of the US Supreme Judges Marshall and Hughes: “If, arguing that the 
Constitution today attributes the same things as during its adoption, they want to say that 
great articles of the Constitution should be interpreted as part of , which its creators (on the 
condition of their time and their worldview) have invested in them, then such a judgment 
carries in itself a refutation. In other words, the purpose of interpretation is not to find in  the  
 
 
15 V. A. Chetvernin, Modern concepts of natural law (Moscow: Nauka, 1998). 
16 V. A. Chetvernin, Modern… 
17 R. David y K. Joffre-Spinozi, Basic legal systems of modernity (Moscow: International Relations, 
1999). 
18 V. A. Chetvernin, Modern … 
19 V. A. Chetvernin, Modern … 
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legal act what the legislator says in the text, but to reveal its general ideal, which the 
legislator aspired to "20. 
 
The fact that lawyers are given broad powers regarding the interpretation of legal 
norms can explain the absence of detailed legal regulation in the Roman-German and Anglo-
American legislation. Such practice, for example, is applied even in the criminal legislation 
of a number of countries where, it would seem, there is a need for clear, not double-digit 
legal formulas that would deprive a practicing lawyer of their broad interpretation. So, in the 
criminal law of England there is no concept of "crime". According to British lawyers, it is 
impossible to formulate a concept that would satisfy everyone and cover all acts that are 
criminal in nature. The most general description of this concept is given in the commented 
book of English legislation of Helsbury: “Usually, crime means evil, which affects the security 
and prosperity of society, so that the public is interested in strangling it. Often this is moral 
evil, that is, behavior harmful to the moral state of the whole society”21. 
 
Absent in the legislation of England and the definition of guilt and its forms. Doctrine 
and judicial practice is considered the main form of guilt motive. It is generally recognized 
that the motive does not require proof itself, since there is a presumption that wrongful acts 
committed by the defendant and a reasonable person are always an act of will. A person is 
free to violate or comply with the law22. 
 
This interpretation of guilt is based on Kant’s philosophical understanding of free will 
as the individual’s intelligible ability to moral self-determination. Based on this 
understanding, the conclusion is made: a person is free in the choice of motives, therefore 
he can be condemned for having committed a criminal act, although he had another 
possibility. 
 
Thus, English law considers a crime as sufficient evidence of the existence of a 
“criminal state of the will”. It is assumed that any normal adult person foresees the natural 
consequences of their behavior. English legislation does not define the purpose of 
punishment. Legal practitioners believe that the main goals of punishment are victory of 
justice, correction of a criminal, protection of society, retribution23. 
 
A similar situation is observed in the French criminal law, in which the general 
characteristic of crimes in the Criminal Code is also absent. It also lacks the concept of guilt 
and its forms, extreme necessity, the goals of punishment, the institution of non-convictions 
is quite superficially regulated, and so on. The Criminal Code divides criminal acts into three 
classes: crimes, misdemeanors, offenses, based on the nature of the punishment. All what, 
according to the legal act, is punishable by a painful punishment, or somethimg that 
disgrace, defame, is a crime; what correctional education is appointed for is an offense, a 
police officer is a violation. Thus, the main feature of all types of crime is wrongfulness24. 
 
The fundamental doctrine of a criminal act in European science is German 
legislation. The Criminal Code of Germany is officially called the “Criminal Code of May 15,  
 
 
20 V. A. Chetvernin, Modern … 
21 I. S. Vlasov; N. A. Golovanova y V. N. Eremin, Crime and punishment in England, USA, France, 
Germany, Japan: General part of criminal law (Moscow: Legal literature, 1991).  
22 I. S. Vlasov; N. A. Golovanova y V. N. Eremin, Crime … 
23 I. S. Vlasov; N. A. Golovanova y V. N. Eremin, Crime… 
24 I. S. Vlasov; N. A. Golovanova y V. N. Eremin, Crime … 
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1871, as amended on January 1, 1975”. The Criminal Code of 1871, known as the Criminal 
Code of the German Reich, was based on the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, declared 
democratic legality and was quite liberal. It is precisely under the influence of the classical 
philosophical and legal doctrine that the norms of the Criminal Code contain many appraisal 
norms, “ethical” elements such as “good custom”, “decency”, “legal good”, “untruth”. The 
interpretation of these elements is carried out according to the rules of doctrine and practice. 
The concept of "legal good" as an object of protection is interpreted not only as human life 
and health, but also as home comfort, freedom, night silence, property, rental right, wedding, 
intimate life, and the like. 
 
The new version of the Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany rejected 
the general characteristic of a crime and a criminal offense. Signs of this institution are 
“scattered” according to individual norms and chapters of the General Part of the Criminal 
Code. Thus, Chapter II of the first section, “Explanation of Terms,” states: 1) offenses are 
unlawful acts, for the commission of which is provided at least one year’s imprisonment of 
more than one year; 2) misconduct is unlawful acts, for which punishment is provided at 
least in the form of short-term imprisonment or a fine. From here you can deduce signs of 
crimes and misdemeanors: firstly, this act (deed), secondly, it is illegal, thirdly, punishable 
by imprisonment or a fine. The expression “corpus delicti” is not used in the criminal law of 
the Federal Republic of Germany; always refers to the "composition of the act (action)." 
 
The criminal code of 1871 interpreted the notion of “unlawfulness” as criminal 
unlawfulness, that is, a contradiction only in criminal law. Modern criminal law of Germany 
interprets wrongfulness as a contradiction to the legal state in general. It is emphasized that 
wrongfulness means a contradiction not only of criminal law, but also of civil law, and not 
only “written”, but also general. 
 
Like the criminal law of England and France, in the German Penal Code, the sign of 
guilt is not mentioned in the characteristics of crime, offense and malicious inaction. The 
absence of a special rule on wine is determined by the generally accepted lawyers' teaching 
doctrine of classical philosophy of free will. In itself, a crime is considered sufficient evidence 
of the presence of “evil will”, which is the concept of guilt that is traditional for European 
criminal law. Thus, it is not the law, but the court in each particular case that determines the 
legal nature of the act. In particular, any deliberate or careless act can be recognized by the 
court as not criminal if it finds justifiable circumstances that preclude the unlawfulness of the 
legal order in general. 
 
The US criminal law is characterized by its incompleteness, inexpressiveness, and 
even lack of regulation of individual issues or entire institutions (for example, the institution 
of guilt, the general concept of a crime, the definition of punishment, and so on). All these 




The flexibility of human thinking, not subject to the technical means of servicing a 
person’s life, allowing one to interpret all the positive aspects of human behavior in the prism 
of basic legal values brings legal hermeneutics to a new axiological level. In itself, this 
direction allows us to realize the person, his rights and freedoms of the highest social values. 
 
In search of real law, European lawyers have been given greater powers regarding 
the interpretation of legal norms formulated by legislation. This  circumstance  explains  the  
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importance of philosophical hermeneutics in matters of modern legal thinking, rule-making 
and law enforcement. Depriving the legislator of a monopoly of law-making allows for the 
importance of legal values and principles to be taken into account at all stages of the creation 
and application of law. 
 
For a practicing lawyer (judge) the ability to interpret competently legal norms is one 
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